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1 Introduction
Collusion by participants often poses a serious threat to markets and organizations. Nowhere
is such a threat more intimately felt than in auctions where bidders can manipulate or simply
withdraw their bids to limit competition. Not surprisingly, auctions have provided the volume
and prominence to the study of collusion, with its evidence found in highway construction
contracts (Porter and Zona (1993)), timber sales (Baldwin et al. (1997)), and in school milk
delivery contracts (Pesendorfer (2000), and Porter and Zona (1999)).
In keeping with these evidences are the theoretical findings that “standard” auctions are
vulnerable to bidder collusion, even when the cartel members face mutual asymmetric informa-
tion. McAfee and McMillan (1992) demonstrate in their seminal article that asymmetrically
informed cartel members can structure a knock-out auction that enables them to (re)allocate
the good among themselves efficiently while limiting the seller’s revenue to at most her re-
serve price. The ability by the cartel members to exchange side payments (without getting
detected) is crucial for this result, but they can achieve the same effect via adjusting their bid
rotation or market shares, if auctions are repeated.1
If standard auctions are vulnerable to collusion, can one find an auction rule that is not?
This is the question we pursue in this paper. What makes this question nontrivial is the
informational asymmetry facing potential colluders. If colluders have complete information
about one another, then they can effectively act like a single agent and maximize their joint
payoffs. Then, there would be little room for auction design, for an optimal scheme would
simply reduce to textbook monopoly pricing. If bidders face mutual asymmetric information,
however, they may not effectively coordinate their behavior, and the seller may exploit this to
undermine collusion. Although standard auctions are not capable of this (as has been shown
by extant literature), other auction rule may enable the seller to exploit the bidders’ mutual
asymmetric information more effectively. We seek to identify such an auction rule.
In order to study an optimal response to collusion, one must understand a bidder’s incentive
to participate in collusion. In particular, one must deal with the question of what happens
after a bidder refuses to participate in collusion. What belief would they form about the
subsequent competition and about the types of bidders they face? Can the remaining cartel
members punish the defecting bidder, and if so, to what degree? How one models the (out-of-
equilibrium) belief and the cartel members’ ability to punish a defector determines a bidder’s
1Graham and Marshall (1987), McAfee and McMillan (1992), Mailath and Zemsky (1991), Eso and Schum-
mer (2003), and Marshall and Marx (2007) study collusion in one-shot auctions of various formats, while
Aoyagi (2003), Athey, Bagwell and Sanchirico (2004), Blume and Heidhues (2002), and Skrzypacz and Hopen-
hayn (2004) study collusion in repeated auctions.
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incentive to participate in a collusive arrangement, which in turn determines the scope and
the nature of the seller’s response. In this regard, we take an eclectic approach by considering
both weak and strong notions of collusion-proof auctions.
The weak notion postulates that collusion arises only when it benefits all types of bidders
relative to a non-cooperative play without any updating of beliefs. An auction rule is said to
be weak collusion-proof if it admits no such collusion. This notion is reasonable to the extent
that cartel members will often find it difficult to punish a defector more severely than bidding
competitively. At the same time, the weak notion restricts the bidders’ out-of-equilibrium
beliefs. Hence, we also consider a “strong” notion, which imposes no restriction on the cartel
members’ out-of-equilibrium beliefs or their ability to punish a defector: an auction rule is
defined to be strong collusion-proof if, under that rule, the seller enjoys in every Bayesian
Nash equilibrium the same expected revenue as she would absent any collusion. Further, we
require the strong collusion-proof auction to be robust to the specifics of the cartel operation.
While the alternative notions matter to some extent, they do not affect the main thrust
of our results. We find, largely irrespective of the particular notion used, that a seller can
overcome her vulnerability to collusion in a surprisingly broad range of circumstances. Specif-
ically, a seller can attain the highest revenue she can without any collusion, either if a cartel
is not all-inclusive or if the object is not sold to any bidder with some probability. This re-
sult holds with respect to the weak notion of collusion-proofness but also with respect to the
strong notion given an additional condition (which is satisfied for the case of the all-inclusive
cartel). When neither condition is met, we identify an optimal collusion-proof auction in some
restricted class of auctions. In the process, we establish an exclusion principle which states
that an optimal collusion-proof auction involves a positive probability of not selling to any col-
lusive bidder. The exclusion principle holds quite generally, regardless of the buyers’ support
of valuations, thus exhibiting a qualitative departure from the collusion-free auction design.2
In sum, the present paper suggests that a seller can overcome collusion completely in many
cases and do generally much better than she could if she would resort to simple monopoly
pricing.
The current paper is related to several recent papers.3 First, it is related to our companion
2As is well known, the standard optimal auction allocates the good to a buyer with probability one, if there
is at least one buyer whose infimum valuation is sufficiently high. See Myerson (1981).
3Other authors have studied optimal collusion-proof mechanisms in different contexts. Quesada (2004) finds
an optimal collusion-proof mechanism in the LM setting where an (informed) agent proposes a side contract.
In fact, she treats collusion on participation, but adopts the strong notion similar to Dequiedt (2007) where
the side contract can impose maximum punishment on refusing agents. Jeon and Menicucci (2005) shows that
second-best is achievable in the weak collusion-proof sense, much like Che and Kim (2007), in the nonlinear
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paper, Che and Kim (2007) (henceforth, CK), as well as Laffont and Martimort (1999, 2000)
(henceforth, LM), which studies a collusion-proof contract when, unlike the current setting,
agents can collude only after they participate in the contract. This latter assumption may not
be appropriate in many auctions where bidders are intimately familiar with their opponents
even before participating. In fact, an allegedly predominant form of collusion involves bidders
coordinating on their participation decisions: Colluders either refuse to participate or with-
draw their bids to let a designated cartel member win without facing competition. Further,
the idea of “selling the firm” to potential colluders, featured in Che and Kim (2007), relies on
the agents’ inability to collude on their participation decision. The current paper relaxes the
assumption by allowing the bidders to collude on their participation decision.
In this latter respect, the current paper is related to Dequiedt (2007) and Pavlov (2006),
who also study collusion-proof auctions when bidders can collude on their participation. De-
quiedt considers two bidders with binary types (i.e., of either low or high valuation). He shows
that, if a cartel can commit to punish a defector to his reservation utility, then the seller can
at most collect her reserve price when a bidder’s valuation exceeds that price. This seemingly
pessimistic result, however, has more to do with the binary type of the model than say with
the bidders’ ability to collude on participation or their ability to punish a defector (which in
fact corresponds to the strong notion in the current paper). With binary types, exclusion of
a low valuation type is equivalent to setting a reserve price equal to the high valuation type.
Hence, the optimality of this latter behavior, although completely explainable by our exclusion
principle, may appear to suggest that the seller can’t do any better than adopting a text-book
monopoly pricing. Our paper will show that the optimal collusion-proof auction does not
generally reduce to monopoly pricing, and will typically generate strictly higher revenue.
Like us, Pavlov (2006) considers a model with a continuous bidder types, and his main
result parallels some of the current paper, particularly Theorem 5. There are several dif-
ferences, however. His analysis concerns only the case of the all-inclusive cartel and focuses
only on ex ante symmetric bidders.4 The current paper goes much beyond that environment.
First of all, we consider the general case in which subsets of bidders are collusive. In fact,
the most important result concerns the case in which a proper subset of bidders is collusive
— i.e., at least one bidder is noncollusive or there are multiple bidding cartels — in which
case the second-best outcome is shown to be collusion-proof implementable. Second, we can
pricing context. Laffont and Martimort (1998), Celik (2004) and Faure-Grimaud et al. (2004) study the
optimality of delegation in the presence of collusive agents.
4Our results for the all-inclusive cartel case are obtained independently. As will be apparent, the methods
of analysis are quite different. Of course, the results on other subjects, particularly the subgroup collusion,
are completely new here.
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handle the case of ex ante asymmetric bidders, at least with the all-inclusive cartel: We show
that the second-best outcome is collusion-proof implementable, given a somewhat stronger
condition than is needed for the symmetric bidders case. Third, our model of collusion differs
from his in that we allow members of collusion to reallocate the good once it is sold to one of
the members.
Above all, the ability to handle collusion by a subset(s) of bidders is practically important
and useful. In many circumstances, not all bidders are in a position to collude. Government
auctions used in defense procurement, mineral extraction, or spectrum licenses often have
incumbents with long history of operation competing against relative new comers. Long
term interaction and shared experiences among the incumbents will put them in a better
position to collude than the new comers. Likewise, in auctions for construction repairs or
food service procurement, competition may involve both local and non-local providers, and
the former group may be able to collude more effectively, based on their regular contacts and
their interaction through trade associations. The problem of only a subset of bidders being
collusive introduces a new challenge, since the cartel may prey on noncollusive bidders as
much as on the seller. Hence, a collusion-proof design must eliminate incentives for the cartel
to engage in such behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an auction model
and describes the second-best outcome in a collusion-free environment. Section 3 introduces
a model of collusion and the notion of weak collusion-proof auctions. Section 4 identifies
the properties of weak collusion-proof auctions and uses them to derive a condition that
is necessary and sufficient for implementing the second-best outcome in a collusion-proof
fashion. In Section 5, we characterize the optimal collusion-proof auction when the second-
best is not weak collusion-proof implementable. Section 6 characterizes strong collusion-proof
implementation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Primitives
A risk-neutral seller has an object for sale. The seller’s valuation of the object is normalized
to zero. There are n ≥ 2 risk-neutral buyers who each independently draw a value, θi, on
the object from an interval Θi := [θi, θi] ⊂ R+ according to distribution Fi, which has strictly
positive density fi on the support. We assume that both
Ji(θi) := θi − 1− Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
and Ki(θi) := θi +
Fi(θi)
fi(θi)
.
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are strictly increasing in θi for all i ∈ N . Throughout, we let E[·] :=
∫
Θ
[·]d(∏i∈N Fi(θi)). and
Eθ˜−i [·] :=
∫
Θ−i
[·]d(∏j 6=i Fj(θj)) denote expectation operators based on the prior distribution,
where Θ :=
∏
i∈N Θi and Θ−i :=
∏
j 6=iΘj.
For a later analysis, it is convenient to augment each bidder’s type space to include the
“participation decision” as part of his possible type. Specifically, we let θ∅ denote “non-
participation” or “exit” option available to each bidder with the convention that θ∅ < θi,∀i ∈
N,∀θi ∈ Θi, and define Θi := {θ∅} ∪ Θi. We then let θ := (θ1, ..., θn) ∈ Θ :=
∏
i∈N Θi
denote a possible profile of types in these enriched type spaces. Since we shall consider
randomization in cartel members’ reports over their augmented type spaces, it is convenient
to consider arbitrary probability distribution, µC , over ΘC :=
∏
i∈C Θi for any C ⊂ N and to
use EµC [·] :=
∫
ΘC
[·]d(µC(θC)) as an expectation operator relative to µC .
We now describe arbitrary auction rules, and we do so in direct mechanisms. An auction
rule, M = (q, t), consists of an allocation rule, q = (q1, · · · , qn) : Θ → Q, where Q := {x ∈
[0, 1]n|∑i∈N xi ≤ 1} and a payment rule, t = (t1, ..., tn) : Θ → Rn, such that qi(θ∅, θ−i) =
ti(θ∅, θ−i) = 0,∀i, θ−i ∈ Θ−i. An auction rule determines, for each profile of bidders’ reports
in Θ, a vector of probabilities for the bidders to obtain the object and a vector of expected
payments they must pay, subject to the constraint that, if a bidder does not participate,
he does not receive the good and collects his reservation utility, normalized to zero. Any
equilibrium arising in any auction game can be described as an auction rule in this framework,
so we sometimes use an “outcome” interchangeably with an auction rule.
Fix an auction rule, M = (q, t). Buyer i’s interim payoff when his valuation is θi ∈ Θi but
reports θ˜i ∈ Θi is
uMi (θ˜i, θi) := θiQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i),
where Qi(θi) := Eθ˜−i [qi(θ)] and Ti(θi) := Eθ˜−i [ti(θ)]. Given hidden information and the avail-
ability of the non-participation option, an auction rule must be incentive compatible and
individually rational to be consistent with equilibrium. We say an auction rule M is feasible
if
UMi (θi) := u
M
i (θi, θi) ≥ uMi (θ˜i, θi), ∀i, θi ∈ Θi, θ˜i ∈ Θi. (IC∗)
Note (IC∗) subsumes both incentive compatibility and individual rationality, since it requires
UMi (θi) ≥ uMi (θ∅, θi) = 0. (IR)
Let M denote the set of all feasible auction rules. For later analysis, the following charac-
terization of feasible auction rules proves useful. Its proof, along with most of the others, are
relegated to the Appendix.
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Lemma 0. If M = (q, t) ∈M, then, for each θi ∈ Θi,
UMi (θi) = E
[
Ki(θ˜i)qi(θ˜)1{θ˜i≤θi} + Ji(θ˜i)qi(θ˜)1{θ˜i≥θi} − ti(θ˜)
]
. (1)
Before proceeding, it is useful to consider a collusion-free environment. It is by now well
known that, in such an environment, an optimal auction rule, called second-best or noncollusive
optimal outcome, solves
[NC] max
M∈M
E
[∑
i∈N
ti(θ)
]
,
and its associated outcome is characterized as follows:
Theorem 0. (Myerson) An optimal mechanism that solves [NC] involves the allocation
rule given by ∀θ ∈ Θ,
q∗i (θ) =
{
1 if Ji(θi) > max{0,maxk 6=i Jk(θk)},
0 otherwise,
and yields revenue of
V ∗ := E
[∑
i∈N
Ji(θi)q
∗
i (θ)
]
to the seller.
We assume that E[q∗i (θ)] < 1 for each i ∈ N , or else the optimal mechanism reduces to
bargaining with a single buyer, so there would be no problem of collusion. Letting θˆi :=
min{θi ∈ [θi, θ¯i]|Ji(θ) ≥ 0}, the optimal mechanism allocates the good to the bidder with
the highest virtual valuation Ji(θi) as long as θi ≥ θˆi. In particular, the object is sold with
probability one if there is a bidder i such that Ji(θi) > 0.
3 A Model of Collusion
We here develop our model of collusion geared to the weak notion of collusion-proof auctions,
and later we introduce the strong notion by relaxing some of the assumptions. To this end, we
follow LM and CK and suppose that there are subsets of bidders, called cartels, that enforce
side contracts via uninformed representatives to influence the outcome of the auction game
being played. Formally, a cartel structure is an arbitrary partition C on N whose element
C ∈ C represents a cartel of bidders who “may” collude with one another. This framework
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encompasses a range of possibilities that include the all-inclusive cartel (i.e., C = {N}), that
allows for the presence of noncollusive bidders (i.e., some elements of C may be singleton)
and/or for multiple bidding cartels (i.e., C may include Cj, j = 1, ..., k with |Cj| ≥ 2).
The cartel structure C is a common knowledge for all bidders in N and for the seller. The
assumption that the seller knows the cartel structure, albeit not innocuous, may not be as
restrictive as it may appear. For instance, our analysis would still apply if some cartel may
not collude effectively. Also, the structure of potential bidding cartels (who is likely to collude
with whom) can be sometimes discerned from prior auction experiences and other industry
observables. Of course, none of these issues arise if there is only one cartel, as has been
assumed in all existing papers. In this sense, the current model generalizes all existing models
of collusion.
The time line is similar to that of LM and CK, except for one important difference: Cartels
are formed prior to the bidders’ participation into the mechanism.
 Time line:
• At date 0, each bidder learns his type, θi, drawn from Θi. The realized type is private
information of the bidder, unobservable to the seller as well as to other bidders.
• At date 1, the seller proposes an auction rule M ∈M.
• At date 2, the (uninformed) representative of each cartel C ∈ C simultaneously proposes
a collusive side contract (to be described in detail later). Each member of C ∈ C then
accepts or rejects the contract. If all bidders of C accept, then that cartel’s side contract
is enforced; or else, the members of C play the subsequent game non-cooperatively.
Neither the side contract proposed for a cartel C nor its members’ decision on accepting
that contract is observed by the bidders outside C (and by the seller).
• At date 3, each bidder, i ∈ N , chooses θ˜i ∈ Θi; i.e., he accepts or rejects M , and reports
from Θi if he accepts. (If the side contract of a cartel was accepted, then its members
report according to the side contract.)
• At date 4, if collusion by a cartel is active, then the outcome of their side contract arises.
If no collusion is active, then M results.
 Collusion Technology:
We assume that each cartel has at its disposal four instruments: (a) its members’ partic-
ipation decisions, (b) participating members’ communication with the seller (e.g., bids), (c)
reallocation of the good within the cartel, in case a member of that cartel receives the good,
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and (d) side payments that the cartel members can exchange in a budget-balanced fashion.
These four instruments together encompass all possible ways in which a cartel can coordinate
their members’ behavior.
To formally describe possible manipulations utilizing all these instruments, fix a possible
cartel C ∈ C, and an auction rule M = (q, t) ∈ M the seller may propose. We then suppose
that an uninformed representative of each cartel C, |C| ≥ 2 proposes a side contract to its
members, given that bidders outside C behave non-collusively (or equivalently their repre-
sentatives offer null contracts). The latter presumption is made since later we shall focus on
how non-collusive behavior can be supported as an equilibrium, which requires a unilateral
deviation by each cartel to be prevented. Instead of considering a possible side contract by
each cartel, it is convenient to think of a manipulation, the outcome that will emerge when
that side contract is enforced and all others, including noncollusive bidders and members of
different cartels, report truthfully.
Formally, an outcome, M˜ = (q˜, t˜) is a manipulation of M by cartel C, if there exists a
function, µC : ΘC → ∆ΘC , that maps from their types in ΘC into a probability distribution
over ΘC such that, ∀θ ∈ Θ, ∑
i∈C
q˜i(θ) = EµC(θC)[
∑
i∈C
qi(θ˜C , θN\C)], (RCMC )
q˜i(θ) = EµC(θC)[qi(θ˜C , θN\C)],∀i ∈ N\C, (RCMN\C)
E
[∑
i∈C
t˜i(θ)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)]
]
, (BBMC )
t˜i(θ) = EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)].∀i ∈ N\C. (BBMN\C)
These conditions are explained as follows. First, condition (RCMC ) requires the final as-
signment of the good to be “reallocationally consistent” in the sense that the good is allocated
to any cartel member only if some member of that cartel obtains the good from the seller un-
der some manipulation of reports/participation decision. Condition (BBMC ) allows the cartel
members to exchange side transfers in a budget-balanced fashion. Since budget balancing
is required at the ex ante level, we are allowing for the cartel to finance (from a competi-
tive capital market) across different realizations of its members’ type profiles.5 Conditions
(RCMN\C) and (BB
M
N\C) simply assume that bidders outside C are not colluding: there is no
reallocation and no exchange of side payments among all bidders outside C and between C
5Our results do not change, if budget balancing is required at the ex post level. Clearly, our collusion-proof
implementation result would be stronger with the ex ante version of budget balancing, explaining our choice.
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and N\C. This presumption would be without any loss if N\C were all noncollusive. Even
if N\C may involve some bidding cartels, the above conditions are still sufficient for there to
be an equilibrium with no collusion, since they ensure that the representative of each cartel
offers a null side contract when other cartels adopt null side contracts.
 Incentive Feasibility of Collusion
For collusive manipulation to work, the members of the cartel must have the incentive to
carry it out. We say that M˜ is feasible if it satisfies
U M˜i (θi) ≥ uM˜i (θ˜i, θi), ∀i ∈ C, θi ∈ Θi, θ˜i ∈ Θi, (IC∗C)
and
U M˜i (θi) ≥ UMi (θi), ∀i ∈ C, θi ∈ Θi. (IRMC )
These conditions are explained as follows. First of all, (IC∗C) requires the outcome re-
sulting from collusion to be incentive compatible to all members of cartel. Since the cartel
members face asymmetric information about one another, this condition must hold, regardless
of the specifics of how the cartel is formed and how the members bargain over their collusive
arrangement. Next, (IRMC ) requires that each member of the cartel must do as well with the
proposed manipulation as they would by vetoing that manipulation and acting noncoopera-
tively. Clearly, what each member will get in the latter event depends on the inferences made
by the members of the cartel about that member. Condition (IRMC ) assumes that no new
inferences about the members’ types are made in such an event. This “passivity” of out-of-
equilibrium beliefs is an important element of LM’s weak collusion-proofness notion. Although
(IRMC ) assumes passive out-of-equilibrium beliefs, it in fact accommodates all non-pessimistic
beliefs for our purpose. If a collusive proposal is made unattractive to a bidder with a passive
belief about what will happen when he refuses the proposal, it will be unattractive to him if
his beliefs were more optimistic about that event. In this sense, the real restriction arising
from (IRMC ) is for out-of-equilibrium beliefs to be non-pessimistic. This restriction serves as
a reasonable discipline over belief formation.6
Lastly, note these conditions are imposed only for the members of the cartel, since the
manipulation constitutes its deviation unobserved by outsiders of that cartel. We turn next
6In fact, it is not too difficult to construct a non-collusive equilibrium, supported by an arbitrarily optimistic
belief. The seller can simply make available an option which would pay an arbitrarily large amount to a bidder
(say paid by a different bidder) if the bidders were to coordinate in the right way; the very optimistic belief
that such a coordination would occur in the event of rejecting a collusive offer can sustain a non-collusive
equilibrium. Clearly, such an equilibrium is not believable, and the “passivity” restriction can be seen to place
a discipline against such an equilibrium by limiting the degree of optimism entertainable by the potential
colluders when rejecting a collusive offer.
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to the weak notion of collusion-proof auctions.
Definition WCP. An auction rule M ∈ M is weak collusion-proof (henceforth, WCP), if,
for each cartel C ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2, any feasible manipulation of M by C makes no member
of C strictly better off.
To explain this notion, suppose the seller offers an auction rule M . If M is WCP, then,
for each cartel C, there exists no feasible manipulation that would make some members of
C strictly better (without making the other members of C worse off), given that all other
cartels are inactive. Our WCP notion is the same as the WCP of LM, except that we allow
for randomization and reallocation possibilities in the collusive bidders and that we allow for
proper subsets of bidders to be collusive. It is in fact a natural generalization of their notion to
allow for these new features. It follows from LM that, if an auction rule is WCP, it will admit
an equilibrium in which the representatives of cartels propose no collusive manipulations —
or equivalently, they all propose null side contracts.7
Despite the restrictions, the WCP auctions are worth studying for several reasons. First,
WCP auctions offer a reasonable protection against collusion since it is often unrealistic for
cartel members to punish more severely than bidding noncooperatively. Second, the weak
notion provides a conservative test of when collusion imposes a real cost to the seller: If for
instance there is no WCP auction that would allow a seller to earn the second-best revenue,
then one can safely conclude that collusion matters, for the seller would not fare any better if
the bidders can collude more effectively. Finally, the restrictions involved in the WCP notion
are not crucial for the results obtained. We will later show that under some condition, the
main result can be strengthened to the strong notion of collusion-proofness.
4 WCP Implementation of the Second-Best Outcome
In this section, we characterize the properties of WCP auction rules (Lemma 1 and 2) and use
these properties to obtain a necessary condition for the second-best outcome to be WCP im-
plementable (Theorem 1). We then show that, for symmetric bidders, the necessary condition
is also sufficient for the WCP implementability of the second-best outcome.
7Our WCP requirement is equivalent to that the auction rule be “interim incentive efficient” according
to the terminology of Holmstrom and Myerson (1983). Crawford (1985) shows that this latter condition
is sufficient for a mechanism to be “attainable” in the sense of withstanding a collusive proposal when the
proposal is negotiated according to some modified Nash demand game. The WCP requirement is weaker than
“durability” required by Holmstrom and Myerson (1983), however.
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4.1 Properties of WCP Auction Rules
Fix a cartel C ∈ C, and an auction rule M = (q, t) that the seller proposes. It is useful
to have a few definitions. Let qCi (θC) := Eθ˜N\C [qi(θC , θ˜N\C)]. Let qC(θ) :=
∑
i∈C qi(θ) and
QC(θC) := Eθ˜N\C [qC(θC , θ˜N\C)] denote the probability that the auction rule allocates to good
to a member of the cartel given the value profile of all bidders and that of the cartel members,
respectively. Let QC := [0, supθC∈ΘC QC(θC)] be the set of all probabilities with which the
cartel can secure the good to its members under M . This set contains zero since all its
members can boycott the auction i.e., QC(θ∅, · · · , θ∅) = 0. This set is convex since the cartel
members can randomize between boycotting and reporting some profile θC ∈ ΘC . We then
obtain our first property of WCP auction rules.
Lemma 1. If M = (q, t) ∈ M is WCP, then for each C ∈ C there exists a convex function,
r : QC → R+ with r(0) = 0, such that
Eθ˜N\C
[∑
i∈C
ti(θC , θ˜N\C)
]
= r(QC(θC)),∀θC ∈ ΘC .
To see how this property restricts the auction rules, suppose all bidders belong to one cartel,
and suppose the seller wishes to implement a deterministic allocation (i.e., q(·) ∈ {0, 1}).
Lemma 1 implies that, for the auction to be weak collusion proof, it must charge a single price
if and only if the good is sold. More generally, the seller cannot collect any fee from a cartel
whenever its members do not obtain the good. This feature arises from the abilities of the
bidders to collude on their participation decisions; were they charged positive entry fees, they
could all simply refuse to participate. Similarly, the collusive bidders can never be charged
different prices for the same probability of obtaining the good; or else, they could manipulate
their reports (or bids) to pick the lowest price for a given probability of obtaining the good.
The surplus generated from such manipulation can be shared among all cartel members via
appropriate side transfers and reallocations so that (IC∗) and (IRMC ) conditions are satisfied.
Finally, the sale price is (weakly) convex in the probability of the object being allocated to any
cartel member, since the cartel members can at least randomize between non-participation
and any probability of allocation attainable by some reports.
The next property is obtained for a class of allocation rules satisfying monotonicity : for all
C ∈ C, qC(·) is nondecreasing in θC and, for all C ∈ C and for all i ∈ C, qi(·) is nondecreasing
in θi and nonincreasing in θ−i. Let M0 ⊂ M denote the set of auction rules satisfying this
monotonicity. The monotonic allocation rules are reasonable, and would naturally arise from
the standard auctions such as first- and second-price auctions. Next, we define the average
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price charged to the cartel per unit probability:
p(θC) :=

r(QC(θC))
QC(θC)
if QC(θC) > 0,
0 otherwise.
Lemma 2. If M = (q, t) ∈M0 is WCP, then ∀ C ∈ C, ∀ i ∈ C and for almost every θC ∈ ΘC,
(Ki(θi)− p(θC)) qCi (θC) ≥ max
θ′i∈{θ∅}∪[θi,θi]
(Ki(θi)− p(θ′i, θC−i)) qCi (θ′i, θC−i). (2)
This lemma characterizes the extent to which each cartel can “behave like a single agent.”
Specifically, condition (2) resembles an incentive compatibility constraint for a “single” agent
who may consume one of |C| alternative values. But this resemblance is not perfect. First,
that agent realizes “pseudo” value Ki(θi) rather than true value θi. Second, the bidder’s
constraint is required only in one direction, i.e., not to under-report or withdraw from the
auction. Third, the agent may not be able to shift his consumption among the alternative
uses. All together, these features serve to limit the extent to which the cartel can coordinate
their members’ behavior. For instance, the fact that pseudo values, rather than true values,
matter means that the cartel can be forced to sustain some ex post loss. Since Ki(θi) > θi, an
average price of p(θi) > θi need not violate the above constraint. The cartel’s limited ability to
coordinate their behavior arises from the fact that any collusive defection requires a consensus
from all types of bidders. Different types of bidders may have conflicting interests, say about
consumption of the good by any particular type θi. For instance, if θi < p(θC), then the cartel
wishes to cancel such consumption, but the highest type of bidder i would not agree as long
as Ki(θi) > p(θC).
Naturally, the necessary conditions for WCP implementation (given by Lemma 1 and 2)
constrain the set of circumstances in which the second-best outcome is WCP implementable.
We next characterize these circumstances. To this end, fix any bidder i ∈ C for some C ∈ C
with |C| ≥ 2. For each profile θN\C ∈ ΘN\C , let
φi(θN\C) := inf{θi ∈ Θi | Ji(θi) ≥ max{ max
j∈N\C
Jj(θj), 0}}
denote the lowest type of bidder i that can obtain the good with positive probability in the
second-best allocation.
Condition (SB): (i) If C = {N}, then
Ki(θˆi)
(
E
[∑
i∈N
q∗i (θ)
])
≥ E
[∑
i∈N
Ji(θi)q
∗
i (θ)
]
,∀i ∈ N.
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(ii) If C 6= {N}, then, for each C ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2,
E
[∑
i∈C
Ki(φi(θN\C))q∗i (θ)
]
≥ E
[∑
i∈C
Ji(θi)q
∗
i (θ)
]
.
This condition is explained as follows. The RHS of the inequalities represent the amounts
of surplus that should be extracted from the cartel to implement the second-best payoff for
the seller. As will be proven next, the LHS of the inequalities represent the highest payments
that are collusion-proof collectable from the cartel, given the second-best allocation q∗. Thus,
the inequalities are necessary for the second-best outcome to be WCP implementable.
Theorem 1. (Necessity) Condition (SB) is necessary for the second-best outcome to be
WCP implementable.
This theorem immediately identifies a class of situations for which the second-best outcome
is not WCP implementable.
Corollary 1. A second-best outcome is not WCP implementable if it assigns the good to
members of a cartel with probability one.
Proof: Without loss C = N , or else we can simply redefine N to coincide with C. We
show that Condition (SB)-(i) fails if the members of N receives the good with probability one.
Since
∑
i∈N q
∗
i (θ) = 1 for all θ, there must exist i such that Jk(θi) ≥ 0, so θˆk = θk. Hence,
Kk(θˆk) = θk = E[Jk(θk)] < E[
∑
i∈N
Ji(θj)q
∗
i (θ)],
where the strict inequality follows from the assumption (made in Section 2) that E[q∗k(θ)] < 1.
This shows that excluding some types of collusive bidders is crucial for WCP implemen-
tation of the second-best outcome, a theme that will be generalized later.
4.2 WCP Implementation of the Second-Best Outcome: Symmet-
ric Bidders
Here we show that Condition (SB) is also sufficient for the second-best outcome to be WCP
implementable when bidders are symmetric. Specifically, we construct an auction rule that
will WCP implement the second-best outcome, given (SB). Further, this sufficient condition
14
will be seen to hold if either at least one bidder is noncollusive or the second-best mechanism
involves a nontrivial probability of no sale.
We begin with the symmetry assumption: Fi(·) =: F (·) for all i ∈ N , for some common
cdf F (·) which has a positive density f . The associated virtual valuations J and K are
defined analogously, and their monotonicity properties are maintained. Likewise, we let θˆ :=
inf{θ|J(θ) ≥ 0}. Condition (SB) is now more succinctly described in this environment.
Define first θ
(1)
C := maxi∈C θi and θ
(1)
N\C := max{maxi∈N\C θi, θˆ}. (We adopt a convention
that θ
(1)
N\C := θˆ when C = {N}.) Then, Condition (SB) simplifies to:
Condition (SB′): For each C with |C| ≥ 2, E
[
K(θ
(1)
N\C)|θ(1)C > θ(1)N\C
]
≥ E
[
J(θ
(1)
C )|θ(1)C > θ(1)N\C
]
.
As pointed out earlier, this condition requires a collusive bidder’s valuation to be sufficiently
high whenever the good is allocated to him. It turns out that this requirement is not very
onerous to satisfy. The condition holds if at least one buyer is noncollusive or there are more
than one bidding cartel, or if the cutoff threshold θˆ is sufficiently high.
Lemma 3. Condition (SB′) holds if C 6= {N}, or if C = {N} and
K(θˆ) ≥ E
[
J(θ
(1)
N )|θ(1)N > θˆ
]
. (3)
In case of the all-inclusive cartel (i.e., C = {N}), Condition (SB′), or equivalently (3), is
not trivial. For instance, if θˆ = θ, then K(θˆ) = θ, so the condition fails. In other words, a
non-trivial exclusion is necessary to prevent collusion. Although not obvious at first glance, a
similar exclusion is used in the case C 6= {N} in that the good is sold to bidders outside that
cartel with positive probability.
We now construct an auction rule that WCP implements the second-best outcome when
Condition (SB′) holds. Suppose that a second price auction is held with a reserve price θˆ,
and consider the associated outcome M∗ = (q∗, t∗) defined over Θ. (Recall that the outcome
is well defined even when some bidders do not participate, a situation described by θ∅ being
chosen by these bidders.) We then construct a new auction rule Mˆ = (qˆ, tˆ) defined over Θ.
The allocation rule qˆ is constructed so that qˆ(·) = q∗(·). To construct the payment rule tˆ, we
first determine the sale price against each cartel C ∈ C (with |C| ≥ 2). Let αC ∈ [0, 1] satisfy
E
[
αCK(θ
(1)
N\C) + (1− αC)J(θ(1)N\C)|θ(1)C > θ(1)N\C
]
= E
[
J(θ
(1)
C )|θ(1)C > θ(1)N\C
]
. (4)
Condition (SB′) allows such an αC to be well defined. The sale price against cartel C is then
set at HC(θ
(1)
N\C) := αCK(θ
(1)
N\C) + (1− αC)J(θ(1)N\C). This sale price is defined in terms of the
highest type of bidder outside C and is set above J(θ
(1)
N\C) just enough to extract J(θ
(1)
C ) on
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average from the highest valuation bidder in C. Let δC(θ) := HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
∑
i∈C q
∗
i (θ) denote
the expected sale price charged against cartel C.
We now describe the payment rule tˆ. For each noncollusive bidder i (i.e., {i} ∈ C), we set
tˆi(θ) := t
∗
i (θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ. For each cartel C ∈ C, let C(θC) := {i ∈ C|θi 6= θ∅} be the set of its
members who participate in the auction, given θC . For each i ∈ C, if C(θC) = C, then we set
tˆi(θ) :=
1
|C|δC(θ) + Eθ˜−i
[
t∗i (θi, θ˜−i)−
1
|C|δC(θi, θ˜−i))
]
− 1|C| − 1
∑
k∈C\{i}
Eθ˜−k
[
t∗k(θk, θ˜−k)−
1
|C|δC(θk, θ˜−k)
]
(5)
and, if C(θC) ( C, then we set
tˆi(θ) :=
δC(θ) if i ∈ C(θC)0 if i ∈ C\C(θC). (6)
Two properties of the current construction are important. First, in case all bidders par-
ticipate, (5) implies Eθ˜−i [tˆi(θi, θ˜−i)] = Eθ˜−i [t
∗
i (θi, θ˜−i)], ∀i ∈ N , ∀θi ∈ Θi,8 so that each bidder
has the same interim incentives as with M . This property means that the new auction rule
Mˆ inherits the incentive and participation properties of the original auction M∗. Hence,
Mˆ satisfies (IC∗) and implements V ∗. Second, it can be checked from (5) and (6) that∑
i∈C tˆi(θ) = δC(θ) = HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
∑
i∈C q
∗
i (θ) if every member of each cartel participates (or
else, each participating cartel member pays a high “punishment price” equal to δC(θ)). That
is, upon participating, each cartel C ∈ C is charged a single sale price, H(θ(1)N\C), depend-
ing only on non-cartel members’ types and payable only when the object is allocated to its
member. This property satisfies Lemma 1 and also ensures that the cartel cannot manipulate
the sale price charged against its members. These two properties deliver weak collusion-proof
implementation of the second-best outcome:
8To see this, note first, by (5) and symmetry,
E[δC(θ)] = E
[
J(θ(1)C )1{θ(1)C >θ(1)N\C}
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
t∗i (θ)
]
= |C|E [t∗i (θ)] ,∀i ∈ C, (7)
from which it follows that
Eθ˜−i [tˆi(θi, θ˜−i)] = Eθ˜−i [t
∗
i (θi, θ˜−i)]−
1
|C| − 1
∑
k∈C\{i}
Eθ˜
[
t∗k(θ˜)−
1
|C|δC(θ˜)
]
= Eθ˜−i [t
∗
i (θi, θ˜−i)],
where the last equality follows from (7).
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Theorem 2. (Sufficiency) Given Condition (SB′), the auction rule Mˆ is WCP and
achieves the second-best revenue.
Combining Lemma 3 with Theorem 2 produces one of the main results of this paper.
Corollary 2. The second-best outcome is WCP implementable if C 6= {N}, or if C = {N}
but (3) holds.
In words, the second-best outcome is weak collusion-proof implementable if a cartel is not
all-inclusive, which will be the case if either there exists at least one noncollusive bidder or
there are multiple bidding cartels. In these latter cases, the seller can leverage the presence of
the bidders outside a cartel to extract sufficient rents from the cartel. If entire bidders form
a bidding cartel, then no such leverage exists, but the seller can still use the threat of no sale
to accomplish the same objective as long as that threat is sufficiently credible in the sense of
(3).
The following examples illustrate two different scenarios.
Example 1. (C = {{1, 2}}) Suppose there are two bidders each with valuation drawn uni-
formly from [0, 1]. According to Theorem 0, the second-best outcome allocates the object ef-
ficiently for valuation exceeding θˆ = 1
2
, and yields revenue of 5
12
. This also satisfies (3),
so the second-best is WCP implementable. The WCP auction rule charges a sale price of
r∗ := E[J(θ(1)N )|θ(1)N > θˆ] = 5/9 to the bidders, regardless of who win and what their bids are.
Without collusion, each bidder receives the interim payoff of
U Mˆ(θ) =
{
0 if θ ∈ [0, 1
2
)
1
2
θ2 − 1
8
if θ ∈ [1
2
, 1].
Since the cartel is charged a sale price of 5/9, it suffers an ex post loss whenever the highest
valuation is in the interval [1
2
, 5
9
]. Why can they not simply boycott the auction in this situa-
tion? Indeed, their joint surplus will increase by doing so. The problem, however, is that the
increased surplus cannot be allocated to benefit all types; some types will be strictly worse off
and thus object to that move. To illustrate, suppose indeed that the bidders boycott auction
whenever no bidder has valuation exceeding 5/9, and, otherwise, the high-valuation bidder con-
sumes the object. Under this collusive arrangement, labeled M˜ , each bidder’s interim payoff
is9
U M˜(θ) =
{
32
2187
if θ ∈ [0, 5
9
)
1
2
θ2 − 611
4374
if θ ∈ [5
9
, 1].
9This payoff can be obtained by applying the transfer rule in (29) with n = 2, r = 5/9, ρi = 0, and
qi(θi, θ−i) being equal to 1 if θi > max{θ−i, 5/9} and 0 otherwise.
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U Mˆ(·)
U M˜(·)
θ
Interim
payoff
Figure 1: Comparison of interim payoffs from Mˆ and M˜
As can be seen from Figure 1, a bidder benefits from this collusion when his valuation is less
than 0.528 but is strictly worse off if his valuation is higher. Hence, a collusive arrangement
M˜ is not feasible. (The same is true for any other feasible manipulations.) Even though
the net expected surplus may rise with some collusive manipulation, incentive compatibility
facing the collusive bidders limits the way surplus can be allocated across types to make them
uniformly better off. In this sense, our WCP auction exploits the informational asymmetry
facing the collusive bidders.
Example 2. (C = {{1, 2}, {3}}) Consider the example from Section 2, where there are two
collusive bidders and a noncollusive bidder, each with valuation drawn from [1, 2]. Here,
the presence of a noncollusive bidder is crucial for WCP implementability of the second-
best outcome. (If all three bidders belong to one grand cartel, the second-best is not WCP
implementable, for the distribution fails (3).) Our WCP auction charges the sale price of
H{1,2}(θ3) = 2θ3 − 54 to the cartel {1, 2}, In fact, the non-collusive can be induced to reveal
its type as a dominant strategy. The cartel cannot manipulate the sale price, for it is tied
to the non-collusive bidder’s strategy. Further, their ability to collude on participation does
not help. Since the allocation is efficient, when a collusive bidder, say with valuation θ wins,
the cartel ends up paying θ − 1
4
in expected value, which leaves the expected surplus of 1
4
to
the cartel.10 Hence, the cartel has no incentive to boycott the auction regardless of θ. Other
10This can be seen by the fact that
E[t1(θ˜) + t2(θ˜)|θ˜3 < max{θ˜1, θ˜2} = θ] = E[H{1,2}(θ˜3)|θ˜3 < θ] =
∫ θ
1
(
2θ˜3 − 54
θ − 1
)
dθ˜3 = θ − 14 .
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possible incentive for misrepresenting the cartel’s types is also thwarted by the lack of consensus
in the interests among the cartel members in a way much like Example 1.
4.3 WCP Implementation of the Second-Best Outcome: Asymmet-
ric Bidders
We now turn to the case of asymmetric bidders. In this case, the optimal noncollusive auction,
as characterized in Theorem 0, requires bidders to be treated differently based on their ex ante
distribution of types. This presents an extra challenge for the WCP implementation since,
as shown in Lemma 1, the same price is charged no matter which member of the cartel
receives the good. This does not mean, however, that the collusive bidders cannot be treated
differently, for different interests of the heterogeneous types can be exploited to make (IRMN )
difficult to satisfy. Indeed, we will show that the second-best outcome is WCP implementable
at least with respect to the all-inclusive cartel (i.e., C = {N}), under a condition that is not
much stronger than Condition (SB).
Consider now a strict inequality version of (SB)-(i):
Condition (SB∗): Ki(θˆi) > r∗ :=
E[
P
i∈N Ji(θi)q
∗
i (θ)]
E[
P
i∈N q
∗
i (θ)]
,∀i ∈ N.
Theorem 3. Assume C = {N} and Condition (SB∗) holds. Suppose also that (Ji(·) −
r∗)fi(·) is increasing in the interval [θi, J−1i (r∗)] for all i ∈ N . Then, there exists an auction
rule which is WCP and achieves the second-best outcome.
5 Optimal WCP Auctions
What happens if the second-best outcome is not collusion-proof implementable? What will
the optimal WCP auction look like in such a case? While a complete answer to this latter
question is unavailable, we provide two observations that will help answer that question. First,
we show that any optimal WCP auction in a general monotonic class involves “exclusion” — a
positive probability that the object is not sold to any collusive bidder. Second, we characterize
the optimal WCP auction completely in the linear class for the case of symmetric bidders.
5.1 An Exclusion Principle
Corollary 1 shows exclusion of collusive bidders is necessary for a second-best outcome to be
WCP implementable. We generalize this result to an optimal WCP auction in the monotonic
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class. That is, we show below that the optimal auction rule in the monotonic class must entail
some exclusion of collusive bidders. To gain some idea behind this result, suppose to the
contrary that optimal WCP auction sells the object to some members of any given cartel C.
Lemma 1 implies that the seller can only charge a sale price to collusive bidders, regardless
of their types. Meanwhile, Lemma 2 says that this price cannot be too high relative to the
pseudo value, Ki(θi), of the collusive bidder who consumes the good. Combined together,
these lemmas imply that the seller must either charge a low sale price, or else she should
exclude types with low pseudo values from consuming the good.
Theorem 4 (Exclusion Principle). Assume that there are more than one bidder i ∈ C with
θi = θ := maxj∈C θj. Then, the optimal WCP mechanism in M0 requires that the object not
be sold to any member of C with a positive probability.
Proof: Let M = (q, t) denote the optimal WCP mechanism. Suppose to the contrary
that
∑
i∈C qi(θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ, which implies by Lemma 1 that
∑
i∈C ti(θ) = r for some r.
Then, Lemma 2 requires that
r ≤ max
i∈C
Ki(θi) = θ.
Thus, the revenue cannot exceed θ. We now generate a contradiction by constructing a
WCP mechanism which raises a higher revenue than θ: Sell the object at a fixed price r˜,
which is slightly greater than θ, if and only if at least one member of C has a value higher
than r˜. This take-it-or-leave offer is clearly WCP and generates a revenue equal to R(r˜) :=
r˜(1−∏i∈C Fi(r˜)). And R(r˜) > R(θ) = θ for r˜ slightly above θ since
d
dr˜
R(r˜)
∣∣∣
r˜=θ
= (1−
∏
i∈C
Fi(θ))− θ
∑
i∈C
fi(θ)
∏
j 6=i
Fj(θ) = 1 > 0,
where the last equality holds because for each i ∈ C, there exists at least one bidder j 6= i for
whom Fj(θ) = 0.
An optimal auction excludes some low valuation bidders even in the absence of collusion.
Yet, exclusion never arises if there is some buyer i whose valuation is always high so that
Ji(θ) ≥ 0. Collusion tilts the tradeoff toward more exclusion, since the seller can only charge
a single sale price, whereas absent collusion bidding competition generates higher payment
from high valuation types beyond the reserve price. Consequently, an optimal collusion-proof
auction always excludes some types of collusive bidders.
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5.2 Optimal Linear WCP Auctions for Symmetric Bidders
Here, we search for an optimal WCP auction rule when Condition (SB) fails with symmetric
bidders. This condition can only fail when all bidders are collusive (recall Lemma 3 or equiv-
alently Corollary 1), so we focus on that case and assume C = {N}. Further, we restrict our
search to the class of linear auction rules where the aggregate payment schedule is linear in
the probability of sale (to any bidder):
∑
i∈N ti(θ) = r ·Q(θ), for some nonnegative constant
r.11
With a linear auction rule, the seller offers a uniform price against the cartel. This restric-
tion appears to entail very little loss. Recall from Lemma 1 that the seller can only charge
a single price against the cartel for each probability of sale, and that the sale price must be
convex in the probability of sale. The linearity restriction simply eliminates the strictly convex
portion of the sale price. The convex portion would matter only if the cartel is assigned the
object with probability between zero and one at price discount, but this latter feature seems
unlikely to be appealing to the seller (although we have not ruled out this possibility). In
fact, most of the plausible auction rules allocate the object deterministically as functions of
bidders’ types. Any such auction rules can be implemented by linear auction rules.12
Given the linearity restriction, the constraint in Lemma 2 implies
(K(θi)− r)qi(θ) ≥ 0,∀i ∈ N,∀θ ∈ Θ. (8)
Consider the following revenue maximization program:
[C] max
(r,q)
E
[
r
∑
i∈N
qi(θ)
]
subject to ∑
i∈N
Ui(θi) = E
[∑
i∈N
(J(θi)− r)qi(θ)
]
≥ 0 (IC∗1)
and
E
[∑
i∈N
min{K(θi)− r, 0}qi(θ)
]
≥ 0. (K)
The equality in (IC∗1) follows from Lemma 0, which utilizes bidders’ incentive constraints.
Hence, (IC∗1) follows from (IC
∗), which is necessary for any feasible auction rule. In fact,
11Alternatively, we can restrict attention to auction rules that allocate the object efficiently among the
collusive bidders. The analysis based on this restriction is available from the authors.
12As will become clear from the subsequent analysis, a solution to [C] below can be obtained even with an
additional constraint
∑
qi(θ) ∈ {0, 1}.
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without (K), the above maximization problem simply yields the second-best outcome. The
constraint (K) follows from the coalitional incentive constraint in (8) (which in turn follows
from Lemma 2). Since the program [C] only imposes necessary conditions for weak collusion-
proofness, its solution gives an upper bound for the revenue attainable by any linear WCP
auction. We show next that this upper bound is attainable by a WCP auction.
Theorem 5. Assume C = {N} and bidders are symmetric. Then, there exists an optimal
linear WCP auction rule, which implements the solution of [C]. If Condition (SB) fails, then
the optimal linear auction rule involves a sales price, r0, that solves either
max
r∈R+
r(1− F n(K−1(r))) (9)
or
E[J(θ(1)N )|θ(1)N > K−1(r)] = r, (10)
and an allocation rule qˆ(·) that satisfies
qˆi(θ) =
{
1 if θi > max{maxj∈N\{i} θj, θˆ0}
0 otherwise,
(11)
where θˆ0 := K
−1(r0).
The features of optimal WCP auctions are illustrated by the next example.
Example 3. Assume that there are two bidders whose types are uniformly distributed on
interval [m,m+ 1]. Then, J(θ) = 2θ− (m+ 1), K(θ) = 2θ−m, and θˆ = max{m+1
2
,m}. The
exclusion threshold is then given by
θˆ0 =

m+1
2
if m ≤ 7−
√
33
2
m+
√
33−5
4
if 7−
√
33
2
< m ≤ mˆ,
5m+
√
m2+12
6
if m > mˆ,
for some mˆ > 7−
√
33
2
.13 Observe that the optimal WCP auction rule implements the second-
best if and only if m ≤ 7−
√
33
2
. For m > 7−
√
33
2
, θˆ0 > θˆ, so it involves more exclusion than the
second-best outcome. Regardless of m, θˆ0 > m, so the optimal WCP auction always involves
exclusion. This is in sharp contrasts to the second-best outcome which does not involve any
exclusion if m ≥ 1.
13More precisely, mˆ is the level of m such that (9) and (10) are satisfied simultaneously, which is given as a
root of the following equation:
(5m+
√
m2 + 12)(2m2 − 9m− 48) + 6(−2m3 + 9m2 + 46m+ 18) = 0.
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Remark 1. Pavlov (2006) finds the outcome presented in Theorem 5 to be optimal in a more
restricted class of WCP auction rules, namely, those that are linear and symmetric. (Recall
the symmetry restriction is not invoked in the current paper.) In fact, he shows that there
are asymmetric or nonlinear auction rules that are WCP and yield higher revenue than the
optimal auction in the restricted class. However, such auction rules violate our Lemma 1 and
thus are not WCP in our model. This difference arises from the fact that we allow for a
reallocational ability by the cartel, which is not allowed in Pavlov (2006), at least for the main
analysis.
6 Strong Collusion-Proof Implementation
Thus far, we have focused on weak collusion-proof implementation. Weak collusion-proof
auctions protect a seller from a wide range of manipulations collusive bidders may employ. At
the same time, it involves some restrictions. First, it rules out collusion supported by non-
pessimistic beliefs on the part of members of a cartel about what may happen when they refuse
to collude. Although such pessimistic beliefs may not be very plausible, the restriction on
beliefs is nonetheless unsatisfactory. Second, the concept of weak collusion-proofness presumes
that a cartel is organized by a third party who is uninformed of the members’ types. Clearly,
such an assumption simplifies the modeling of the collusive behavior, but has no clear empirical
justification. We show, however, that these restrictions are not crucial for the main result of
the paper: Given an additional condition, the second-best outcome can be implemented in a
way robust to the specific beliefs entertained off the equilibrium path and to the particular
way in which a cartel is formed and its proposal is made.
To begin, we define a strong collusion-proof auction. To that end, fix any arbitrary indirect
auction rule, A = (B, ξ, τ), where B = (B1, ..., Bn) is the profile of the message spaces, Bi
for bidder i, and (ξ, τ) : B → Q × Rn is the outcome function mapping from messages
to an allocation and payments. As before, we assume that Bi includes the option of non-
participation by i and the outcome function maps a null outcome for the bidder invoking that
option. Next, consider an extensive form game in which, for a cartel C ∈ C, each member of C
(which may include a third party maximizing joint payoffs of C) may propose a side contract
which maps from ΘC to a probability distribution over
∏
i∈C Bi and which is reallocationally
consistent (in the sense the side contract allocates the good to a member of a cartel only when
some member of the cartel obtains the good from the seller) and budget balanced, among those
members of C who do not invoke θ∅. Notice the messages used in the side contract contain
the nonparticipation option θ∅ by each member, meaning that the terms of side contract can
23
vary depending on who refuse and who accept the contract. In other words, like Dequiedt
(2007), we allow the remaining members of a cartel to commit themselves to punish a member
when the latter refuses to participate in collusion. If a side contract has been proposed, the
members of the cartel then simultaneously decide whether to reject all side contracts or accept
one of them, and the messages in B are chosen according to the agreed-upon side contract,14
the seller determines the outcome based on the message according to the auction rule, and
the good is reallocated and side transfers are exchanged according to the agreed-upon side
contracts. Let EA be the set of all Bayesian Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. The
strong collusion-proof auctions are then defined as follows.
Definition SCP. Expected revenue V is strong collusion-proof (henceforth, SCP) imple-
mentable if there exists an indirect auction rule, A = (B, ξ, τ), such that EA is nonempty
and that the seller receives expected revenue of V in every equilibrium of EA.
It is worth emphasizing that SCP implementation restricts neither cartel members’ out-
of-equilibrium beliefs nor, as noted above, their ability to punish a defector. In fact, an
SCP auction implementing V would guarantee the seller the revenue in every Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, let alone every Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. More important, an SCP auction
(or precisely an auction SCP implementing a target level of revenue) is robust to who proposes
the collusive proposal. In these respects, the current SCP notion is stronger than any existing
notions proposed by the existing authors.
Consider the case of ex ante symmetric bidders. Assume further that there exists only one
cartel C ∈ C with |C| > 1. In this case, we show that the second-best revenue V ∗ is SCP
implementable, given (SB′) and an additional condition. We construct the auction rule that
SCP implements the desired outcome. That auction rule, labeled A = (B, ξ, τ), builds on the
WCP auction, Mˆ . Recall that Mˆ provides a dominant strategy incentive for each noncollusive
bidder to participate and report truthfully, a feature we retain in A.
We augment the WCP auction Mˆ by adding a message, rz, for each cartel member, which
is interpreted as a statement: “I reject Mˆ but would like to buy the item with an eagerness of
z,” where z is a positive integer of his choosing. Let Bi := Θi ∪{rz, z = 1, 2, · · · } if i ∈ C and
Bi := Θi otherwise. We then define the outcome function (ξ, τ) such that it coincides with
Mˆ if no bidder in C announces rz, but if some bidder in C announces rz, then the outcome
function is constructed as follows. Consider the following condition:
Condition (R): For each C ∈ C, there exists some θ′ ∈ [θˆ, θ¯] satisfying
U Mˆ(θ¯) ≤ F n−|C|(θ′)
(
θ¯ − E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
∣∣∣ θ(1)N\C ≤ θ′]) . (12)
14That is, a bidder’s subsequent bidding is not bound by any side contract that he refused.
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Given Condition (R), the outcome function (ξ, τ) of A depends on whether (a) the inequality
in (12) holds strictly for all θ′ ∈ [θˆ, θ¯] or (b) there exists some θr ∈ [θˆ, θ¯] satisfying
U Mˆ(θ¯) = F n−|C|(θr)
(
θ¯ − E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
∣∣∣ θ(1)N\C ≤ θr]) . (13)
In both cases, if there is a collusive bidder who announces rz, then we pick the bidder who
announces rz with the highest z (with a tie broken randomly among bidders with the same
z). In case (a), the bidder receives the object with probability 1 at a fixed price T ∗i (θ¯). In
case (b), the bidder receives the object at price HC(θ
(1)
N\C) if θ
(1)
N\C ≤ θr, or else the bidder is
not awarded the object and he pays nothing. Last, no other bidders receive the object or pay
any amount to the seller.
In words, the auction rule A gives an option for a collusive bidder with the highest valuation
to secure her non-collusive payoff by announcing rz with the highest integer z. This extra
option serves to limit the cartel’s ability to punish a defector, which in turn constrains the set
of side contracts sustainable in equilibrium. At the same time, the option itself may become
an instrument of collusion if it proves too profitable. Condition (R) ensures that this is not
the case.
Theorem 6. Suppose that there is a single cartel C ⊂ N . Then, given Conditions (SB′) and
(R), the second-best revenue V ∗ is SCP implementable.
How restrictive is Condition (R)? If the cartel is all-inclusive (i.e., C = N), then Condition
(R) involves no restriction, for it is always satisfied. To see this, observe the condition in (12)
with θ′ = θ¯ becomes
T ∗i (θ¯) ≥ HN(θˆ).
This inequality holds since
T ∗i (θ¯) > E
[
T ∗i (θi)
Q∗i (θi)
Q∗i (θi)
E [Q∗i (θi)]
]
=
E [T ∗i (θi)]
E [Q∗i (θi)]
=
E [J(θi)Q∗i (θi)]
E [Q∗i (θi)]
=
E
[∑
i∈N J(θi)q
∗
i (θ)
]
E
[∑
i∈N q
∗
i (θ)
] = HN(θˆ),
where the inequality holds since
T ∗i (·)
Q∗i (·) is increasing (since
T ∗i (·)
Q∗i (·) corresponds to the equilibrium
bidding function in the symmetric first-price auction), and the last equality follows from (4).
If C 6= N , then Condition (R) need not always hold. Nevertheless, the condition is satisfied
for a reasonable class of distributions, including the uniform distribution.15
15For instance, in the Example 2, (12) holds since
max
θ∈[1,2]
Fn−|C|(θ)
(
θ¯ − E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
∣∣∣ θ(1)N\C ≤ θ]) = max
θ∈[1,2]
(
−θ2 + 13
4
θ − 9
4
)
=
25
64
>
1
3
= UMˆ (θ¯).
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Remark 2. That Condition (R) is often not very restrictive suggests that the particular notion
of collusion-proofness does not play a significant role. In particular, the second-best outcome
is SCP implementable whenever it is WCP implementable if the cartel is all-inclusive or if
an additional reasonable condition holds. This suggests that the seemingly pessimistic result
of Dequiedt (2007) is not attributable to the cartel’s ability to punish a defector, but rather to
the binary type structure of his model. In fact, with the binary type, our weak collusion-proof
notion would have led to the same result as his. By our Exclusion Principle, a WCP auction
must always exclude the low type, but this means that the seller can never do better than selling
the good at the price equal to the high valuation. Theorem 6 suggests that, given non-binary
types, the seller can typically do strictly better than this even when the cartel can commit to
punish the defector (as has been assumed in our SCP notion).
7 Conclusion
We have studied optimal collusion-proof auctions when a group of bidders can collude not only
on their messages (e.g., “bids”), but also on their participation decisions. Despite this strong
collusive power, we have shown that the asymmetric information facing the collusive bidders
can be exploited to significantly weaken their collusive power, by eliminating the scope of
collusive arrangements that could make all collusive bidders uniformly better off regardless of
their types. We show that the second-best outcome is achievable if a cartel is not all-inclusive
(which will be the case either if there is a noncollusive bidder or if there are multiple bidding
cartels), or if the outcome involves a nontrivial probability of the object not being allocated
to any bidder. More generally, we have shown that the optimal collusion-proof auction rule
involves a positive probability of the object not being allocated to a collusive bidder.
Our results have two broad implications. First, unlike the prevailing impression based
on the existing literature, the presence of bidder collusion need not mean that the seller can
do no better than textbook monopoly pricing. Our seller can do as well as if there is no
collusion in a broad set of circumstances, and do generally much better than simple monopoly
pricing. Second, an auction rule different from standard may be more desirable when bidder
collusion is a serious issue. We have identified an auction with a group-based sale price as
being unsusceptible to collusion.
It is legitimate to ask whether our collusion-proof auction rule is used in practice, but
the answer is not immediately clear. Our collusion-proof auction may be implemented in
different ways, some of which may not even resemble an auction. For instance, our auction
may be implemented by a seller who negotiates with a group of organized bidders for a single
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sale price. Indeed, it is quite common for a procurer of a service or a good to negotiate
with a prime contractor acting as a representative of a group of contractors. Whether such
a collective negotiation approach serves as a response to possible collusion among contractors
is an interesting, yet unresolved, question.
It is of course quite possible that our collusion-proof auction has no real world correspon-
dence. To the extent that this is true, there may be a couple of reasons. One may be simply
that collusion is not a serious enough problem in many scenarios, at least serious enough to
depart from a standard auction. Alternatively, the reason may be attributable to two re-
strictive features of our auction design. First, our collusion-proof auction involves Bayesian
implementation, which does rely on bidders’ common knowledge of priors, i.e. the assump-
tion that bidders know the distribution of other bidders’ types, know that they know the
distribution, and so on and so forth. It is unlikely for bidders to possess such a knowledge,
especially when they lack the opportunity to develop such a knowledge from repeated inter-
actions. Relaxing the common knowledge of priors by strengthening the solution concept, say
to dominant strategies, seems to be an important next step in the research of collusion-proof
auctions. The implication of such an extension is not a priori obvious, however, since it affects
the contracting problem at both ends, i.e., for both the auction designer and for the colluding
bidders. Collusion may indeed become easier to prevent if dominant-strategy incentives are
very difficult to provide in a budget-balanced fashion among the colluders. Second, we have
assumed that the seller has accurate information about the cartel structure; i.e., which bidders
belong to what cartel. While this assumption is not unrealistic in many situations, it would be
better if the auction design need not require specific knowledge about the cartel structure. In
a sense, an important lesson from the current paper may be the highlighting of these features
as further challenges to overcome in collusion-proof auction design.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 0. It suffices to show that (IC∗) implies the following: for all i ∈ N and
all θ˜i ∈ Θi,
UMi (θi) = E
[
Ki(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≤θi} + Ji(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≥θi} − Ti(θ˜i)
]
. (14)
Note first that a well-known necessary condition for (IC∗) is: for all i ∈ N and all θ˜i, θi ∈
Θi,
UMi (θi)− UMi (θ˜i) =
∫ θi
θ˜i
Qi(a)da. (15)
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We show that (15) implies (14). Since UMi (θ˜i) = θ˜iQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i), (15) becomes
UMi (θi) = θ˜iQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i) +
∫ θi
θ˜i
Qi(a)da.
Taking expectation on both sides regarding θ˜i yields
UMi (θi) = E[θ˜iQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i)] +
∫ θi
θi
∫ θi
θ˜i
Qi(a)dadFi(θ˜i)
= E[θ˜iQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i)] +
∫ θi
θi
∫ θi
θ˜i
Qi(a)dadFi(θ˜i) +
∫ θ
θi
∫ θi
θ˜i
Qi(a)dadFi(θ˜i)
= E[θ˜iQi(θ˜i)− Ti(θ˜i)] +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(θ˜i)Fi(θ˜i)dθ˜i −
∫ θ
θi
Qi(θ˜i)(1− Fi(θ˜i))dθ˜i
= E
[
Ki(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≤θi} + Ji(θ˜i)Qi(θ˜i)1{θ˜i≥θi} − Ti(θ˜i)
]
,
where the third equality follows from the integration by parts.
Proof of Lemma 1. To begin with, define TC(θC) := Eθ˜N\C [
∑
i∈C ti(θC , θ˜N\C)] and QsC :=
{Q ∈ QC |Q = QC(θC) for some θC ∈ ΘC}. Then, let us define r : QC → R+ as the greatest
convex function such that for all Q ∈ QsC ,
r(Q) ≤ inf{TC(θC)|QC(θC) = Q}.
We show that r(QC(θC)) = TC(θC) for almost every θC . Suppose not. Then, it must be that
for some  > 0,
E [r(QC(θC))] +  < E [TC(θC)] . (16)
Also, by the definition of r(·), it is possible to find µC : ΘC → ∆ΘC satisfying that for all θC ,
EµC(θC)
[
TC(θ˜C)
]
≤ r(Q(θC)) +  and EµC(θC)[QC(θ˜C)] = QC(θC). (17)
We now show that M cannot be WCP with respect to C by constructing a weakly feasible
manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) of M by cartel C with which some bidder is better off than with M .
Let the cartel manipulate its type reports using µC(·), whereafter, the object is reallocated
to bidder i with probability wi(θC) :=
qCi (θC)
QC(θC)
so that
∑
i∈C wi(θC) = 1, satisfying (RC
M
C ).
Note that the interim allocation for each collusive bidder i ∈ C is preserved since
q˜Ci (θC) = ωi(θC)Eθ˜N\C
[
EµC(θC)[qC(θ˜C , θ˜N\C)]
]
= ωi(θC)EµC(θC)[QC(θ˜C)] = ωi(θC)QC(θC) = q
C
i (θC), (18)
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where the second equality follows from changing the order of expectations, the third from
(17), and the last from the definition of ωi(·).
Next, the cartel manipulates the transfer rule as follows: Letting tµi (θ) := EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)],
set t˜j(θ) = t
µ
j (θ) for each j ∈ N\C, and for each i ∈ C,
t˜i(θ) = t
µ
i (θ) + Eθ˜−i
[
ti(θi, θ˜−i)− tµi (θi, θ˜−i)
]
− 1|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
Eθ˜−j
[
tj(θj, θ˜−j)− tµj (θj, θ˜−j)
]
+ σi,
where
∑
i∈C σi = 0. Note that
∑
i∈C t˜i(θ) =
∑
i∈C t
µ
i (θ), which satisfies (BB
M
C ) while (BB
M
N\C)
is obviously satisfied. Also,
Eθ˜−i
[
t˜i(θi, θ˜−i)
]
= Eθ˜i
[
t(θi, θ˜−i)
]
− κi, (19)
where
κi :=
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
E
[
tj(θ)− tµj (θ)
]− σi.
Then, one can choose σ′is so that κi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ C, since
∑
i∈C
κi = E
[∑
i∈C
(ti(θ)− tµi (µ))
]
= E
[
TC(θC)− EµC(θC)[TC(θ˜C)]
]
> 0, (20)
where the inequality follows from (16) and (17). So, (IC∗) and (IRCN) are satisfied for collusive
bidders, due to (18), (19), and κi ≥ 0,∀i ∈ C, which means that M˜ is a weakly feasible
manipulation of M . Also, some collusive bidder is better off than in M since κj > 0 for some
j ∈ C.
Proof of Lemma 2. To begin, we adopt the convention that θ∅ < θi for all i ∈ N . Observe
that QC(·) and qCi (·) inherit the monotonicity of qC(·) and qi(·), respectively, and hence are
a.e. continuous. Also, since r(·) is convex with r(0) = 0, p(·) is nondecreasing and hence a.e.
continuous also. Suppose to the contrary that (2) does not hold for almost every type profile.
Then, we can find some bidder k ∈ C and a positive measure set ΘˆC−k ⊂ ΘC−k such that for
each θC−k ∈ ΘˆC−k, there exist θk ∈ Θk and θ′k ∈ Θ satisfying
(Kk(θk)− p(θk, θC−k))qCi (θk, θC−k) < (Kk(θk)− p(θ′k, θC−k))qCi (θ′k, θC−k).
Then, the a.e. continuity of qCi (·) and p(·) guarantees that for each θC−k ∈ ΘˆC−k, we can find
two types θˆk(θC−k) ∈ Θ and ˆˆθk(θC−k) > θˆk(θC−k) such that for all θk ∈ (θˆk(θC−k), ˆˆθk(θC−k)],
(Kk(θk)− p(θk, θC−k))qCi (θk, θC−k) < (Kk(θk)− p(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k))qCi (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k). (21)
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We now define
ΘˆC := {(θk, θC−k) ∈ Θ|θC−k ∈ ΘˆC−k and θk ∈ (θˆk(θC−k), ˆˆθk(θC−k)]},
qˆCk (θC−k) := q
C
k (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k), and pˆ(θ−k) := p(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k). Note that (21) holds for all
θC ∈ ΘˆC .
In order to draw a contradiction, we construct a weakly feasible manipulation of M ,
M˜ = (q˜, t˜), which makes bidder k better off.
Consider the following report manipulation, denoted µC : ΘC → ∆ΘC , and reallocation
scheme by the cartel: if θC /∈ ΘˆC , then report truthfully and do not perform any reallocation
while if θC ∈ ΘˆC , then (i) report truthfully with probability
P
i∈C\{k} q
C
i (θC)
QC(θC)
and, once the
object is assigned, reallocate it to bidder i ∈ C\{k} with probability qCi (θ)P
i∈C\{k} q
C
i (θC)
, (ii) report
(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) (or (θ∅, · · · , θ∅) in case θˆk(θC−k) = θ∅) with probability qˆ
C
k (θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k)),θC−k)
and,
once the object is assigned, reallocate it to bidder k with probability 1, and (iii) choose
(θ∅, · · · , θ∅) (or nonparticipation) with the remaining probability.16 This manipulation will
result in the following allocation probabilities: for bidder i ∈ C\{k},
q˜Ci (θC) = QC(θC)
∑
i∈C\{k} q
C
i (θC)
QC(θC)
qCi (θC)∑
i∈C−k q
C
i (θC)
= qCi (θC) if θC ∈ ΘˆC ,
and simply q˜Ci (θC) = q
C
i (θC) if θC /∈ ΘˆC . Likewise, for bidder k, if θC /∈ ΘˆC , then q˜Ck (θC) =
qCk (θC), and if θC ∈ ΘˆC , then
q˜Ck (θC) = QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
qˆCk (θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
= qˆCk (θC−k). (22)
It can be easily verified that q˜Ck (·, θC−k) is nondecreasing for every θC−k.17 Thus, the interim
allocation Q˜i(θi) = Eθ˜C−i [q˜
C
i (θi, θ˜C−i)] is also nondecreasing for each i ∈ C.
16It is important to make sure that the probability of reporting truthfully or (θˆ(θC−k), θC−k) does not exceed
1, for which it suffices to verify that qˆ
C
k (θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k),θC−k)
≤ qCk (θC)QC(θC) . This holds trivially if θˆk(θC−k) = θ∅. If
θˆk(θC−k) 6= θ∅, it holds since
qˆCk (θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
= 1−
∑
i∈C\{k} q
C
i (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
≤ 1−
∑
i∈C\{k} q
C
i (θC)
QC(θC)
=
qCk (θC)
QC(θC)
,
where the inequality holds since QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) ≤ QC(θk, θC−k) and qCi (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) ≥ qCi (θk, θC−k)
for all i 6= k, by the monotonicity of QC(·) and qCi (·).
17To see this, consider arbitrary θk and θ′k with θ
′
k > θk, and θC−k: (i) if (θk, θC−k), (θ
′
k, θC−k) ∈ ΘˆC , then
q˜Ck (θk, θC−k) = q˜
C
k (θ
′
k, θC−k) = qˆ
C
k (θC−k), (ii) if (θk, θC−k) ∈ ΘˆC and (θ′k, θC−k) /∈ ΘˆC , then θˆk(θC−k) < θk ≤
ˆˆ
θk(θC−k) < θ′k and thus q˜
C
k (θk, θC−k) = q
C
k (θˆk(θC−k), θC−k) ≤ qCk (θ′k, θC−k) = q˜Ck (θ′k, θC−k). And other cases
can be dealt with similarly.
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After the manipulation, the cartel’s aggregate payment becomes
Eθ˜N\C
[
EµC(θC)[
∑
i∈C
ti(θ˜C , θ˜N\C)]
]
=
 r(QC(θC))
∑
i∈C\{k} q
C
i (θC)
QC(θC)
+ r(QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k))
qˆCk (θC−k)
Q(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
if θC ∈ ΘˆC
r(QC(θC)) otherwise,
which yields
E
[
EµC(θC)[
∑
i∈C
ti(θ˜C , θN\C)]
]
= E [r(QC(θC))] + EθC∈ΘˆC
[
r(Q(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k))
qˆCk (θC−k)
QC(θˆk(θC−k), θC−k)
− r(QC(θC)) q
C
k (θC)
QC(θC)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
ti(θ)
]
+ EθC∈ΘˆC
[
pˆ(θC−k)qˆCk (θC−k)− p(θC)qCk (θC)
]
(23)
Next, t˜(·) is constructed as follows. For each j ∈ N\C, set t˜j(θ) = EµC(θC)[tj(θ˜C , θN\C)].
For each i ∈ C, we set
t˜i(θ) = EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)] + Yi(θi)−
1
|C| − 1
∑
j∈C\{i}
Yj(θj) + ρi,
where
Yi(θi) := θiQ˜i(θi)−
∫ θi
θi
Q˜i(a)da− Eθ−i [EµC(θC)[ti(θ˜C , θN\C)]],
and
ρi :=
1
|C| − 1Eθ−i
 ∑
j∈C\{i}
Yj(θj)
− UMi (θi) for i ∈ C\{k}, and ρk = − ∑
i∈C\{k}
ρi.
By construction, then t˜ satisfies (BBMC ) and (BB
M
N\C).
We now complete the proof by showing that M˜ is a weakly feasible manipulation and
makes bidder k better off. To this end, observe that for an arbitrary θk ∈ Θk,
U M˜k (θk) +
∑
i∈C\{k}
U M˜i (θi)
= E
(Kk(θ˜k)q˜k(θ˜)) 1{θ˜k<θk} + (Jk(θ˜k)q˜k(θ˜)) 1{θ˜k>θk} + ∑
i∈N\{k}
Ji(θ˜i)qi(θ˜)−
∑
i∈C
t˜i(θ˜)

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= E
(Kk(θ˜k)qk(θ˜)) 1{θ˜k<θk} + (Jk(θ˜k)qk(θ˜)) 1{θ˜k>θk} + ∑
i∈N\{k}
Ji(θ˜i)qi(θ˜)−
∑
i∈C
ti(θ˜)

+Eθ˜C∈ΘˆC
[
Kk(θ˜k)(q˜
C
k (θ˜C)− qCk (θ˜C))1{θ˜k<θk} + Jk(θ˜k)(q˜Ck (θ˜C)− qCk (θ˜C))1{θ˜k>θk}
−
(
pˆ(θ˜C−k)qˆCk (θ˜C−k)− p(θ˜C)qCk (θ˜C)
)]
= UMk (θk) +
∑
i∈C\{k}
UMi (θi)
+Eθ˜C∈ΘˆC
[(
(Kk(θ˜k)− pˆ(θ˜C−k))qˆCk (θ˜C−k)− (Kk(θ˜k)− pk(θ˜C))qCk (θ˜C)
)
1{θ˜k<θk}
+
(
(Jk(θ˜k)− pˆ(θ˜C−k))qˆCk (θ˜C−k)− (Jk(θ˜k)− pk(θ˜C))qCk (θ˜C)
)
1{θ˜k>θk}
]
> UMk (θk) +
∑
i∈C\{k}
UMi (θi). (24)
The first equality follows from Lemma 0, the second from (23), the third from the rearrange-
ment and (22), and the inequality from (21) and the fact that for all θ˜C ∈ ΘˆC ,
Jk(θ˜k)(qˆ
C
k (θ˜C−k)− qCk (θ˜C)) ≥ Kk(θ˜k)(qˆCk (θ˜C−k)− qCk (θ˜C)),
since qˆCk (θ˜C−k) ≤ qCk (θ˜C) and Jk(θ˜k) < Kk(θ˜k).
From the construction of t˜(·), one can easily verify that U M˜i (θi) = UMi (θi), ∀i ∈ C\{k}.
Then, (24) implies U M˜k (θk) > U
M
k (θk) for all θk ∈ Θk or bidder k is better off. The construction
of t˜(·) and monotonicity of Q˜i(·),∀i ∈ C guarantee that M˜ satisfies (IC∗) for all collusive
bidders. The proof will be complete if (IRMC ) holds for all i ∈ C\{k}:
U M˜i (θi) = U
M˜
i (θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Q˜i(θ˜)dθ˜ = U
M
i (θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Qi(θ˜)dθ˜ = U
M
i (θi),∀θi ∈ Θi
since U M˜i (θi) = U
M
i (θi) and Q˜i(·) = Qi(·), ∀i ∈ C\{k}.
Proof of Theorem 1. Suppose that an auction rule M = (q, t) ∈M WCP implements the
second-best outcome. Then, q(·) = q∗(·) and Ui(θi) = 0 for all i ∈ N , which implies by Lemma
0 that for any C ⊂ N ,
E
[∑
i∈C
ti(θ)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
Ji(θi)q
∗
i (θi)
]
. (25)
By Lemma 1, there exists a convex function r(·) that represents the total payment for the
cartel.
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We first consider the case C = {N}. Since q∗N(θ) = 0 or 1 for all θ ∈ Θ, Lemma 1 implies
that p(θ) = r∗ whenever q∗N(θ) = 1. We first prove θˆi > θi for all i ∈ N . Suppose not. Then,
there exists k such that Jk(θk) ≥ max{maxi∈N\{k} Ji(θi), 0}. It follows that q∗k(θ1, · · · , θn) > 0,
so p(θ1, · · · , θn) = r∗. Since r∗ ≥ V ∗ > θi = Ki(θi), we have a contradiction to (2).
We next consider the case C 6= {N}. Fix any C with |C| ≥ 2. If no such C exists,
there is no collusion, so we are done. For each bidder i ∈ C and his type θi ∈ Θi, let
Xi(θi) := Pr{θC−i ∈ ΘC−i | Ji(θi) > maxk∈C\{i} Jk(θk)} be the probability that i has the
highest virtual value among the collusive bidders, and let Yi(θi) := Pr{θN\C ∈ ΘN\C | Ji(θi) >
max{maxk∈N\C Jk(θk), 0}}. Letting pi(θi) := r(Yi(θi))Yi(θi) for each i ∈ C, Lemma 2 implies that,
∀θi ≥ θˆi
(Ki(θi)− pi(θi))Yi(θi) ≥ max{0, max
θ′i∈[θˆi,θi]
(Ki(θi)− pi(θ′i))Yi(θ′i)}.
By the envelope theorem argument, ∀θi ≥ θˆi,
(Ki(θi)− pi(θi))Yi(θi) ≥ (Ki(θˆi)− pi(θˆi))Yi(θˆi) +
∫ θi
θˆi
K ′i(a)Yi(a)da ≥
∫ θi
θˆi
K ′i(a)Yi(a)da
or
pi(θi)Yi(θi) ≤ Ki(θi)Yi(θi)−
∫ θi
θˆi
K ′i(a)Yi(a)da.
Thus, we have
E
[∑
i∈C
ti(θ)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
r(Yi(θi))Xi(θi)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
pi(θi)Yi(θi)Xi(θi)
]
≤ E
[∑
i∈C
(
Ki(θi)Yi(θi)−
∫ θi
θˆi
K ′i(a)Yi(a)da
)
Xi(θi)
]
. (26)
Letting Zi(θi) =
∫ θ¯i
θi
Xi(s)dFi(s),
E
[(
Ki(θi)Yi(θi)−
∫ θi
θˆi
K ′i(a)Yi(a)da
)
Xi(θi)
]
=
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
Ki(θi)Yi(θi)Xi(θi)dFi(θi)−
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
∫ θi
θˆi
K ′i(a)Yi(a)daXi(θi)dFi(θi)
=
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
Ki(θi)Xi(θi)Yi(θi)dFi(θi)−
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
K ′i(θi)Yi(θi)Zi(θi)dθi
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=∫ θ¯i
θˆi
Ki(θi)Xi(θi)Yi(θi)dFi(θi)−Ki(θi)Yi(θi)Zi(θi)
∣∣θ¯i
θˆi
+
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
Ki(θi) (Y
′
i (θi)Zi(θi) + Yi(θi)Z
′
i(θi)) dθi
= Ki(θˆi)Yi(θˆi)Zi(θˆi) +
∫ θ¯i
θˆi
Ki(θi)Y
′
i (θi)Zi(θi)dθi
= E
[
Ki(φi(θN\C))q∗i (θ)
]
.
The second and fourth equalities follow from integration by parts. To verify the fifth equality,
note that Yi(θˆi) = Pr{φi(θN\C) = θˆi}, Yi(s) = Pr{φi(θN\C) ≤ s} for each s > θˆi, and
Zi(s) = E[q∗i (θ)|φi(θN\C) = s]. Combine this derivation with (25) and (26) to obtain (ii) of
Condition (SB).
Proof of Lemma 3. First, we prove that Condition (SB′) holds for any C with 2 ≤ |C| < n.
To this end, observe that
E
[
K(θ
(1)
N\C)1{θ(1)C >θ
(1)
N\C}
]
= K(θˆ)(1− F |C|(θˆ))FN−|C|(θˆ) +
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(
θ +
F (θ)
f(θ)
)
(1− F |C|(θ))dFN−|C|(θ)
= K(θˆ)(1− F |C|(θˆ))FN−|C|(θˆ) +
∫ θ¯
θˆ
θ(1− F |C|(θ))dFN−|C|(θ)
+
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(N − |C|)(1− F |C|(θ))FN−|C|(θ)dθ. (27)
Observe also that
E
[
J(θ
(1)
C )1{θ(1)C >θ
(1)
N\C}
]
=
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(
θ − 1− F (θ)
f(θ)
)
FN−|C|(θ)dF |C|(θ)
= −(1− F |C|(θ))θFN−|C|(θ)
∣∣∣θ¯
θˆ
+
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(1− F |C|(θ))d (θFN−|C|(θ))− ∫ θ¯
θˆ
|C|(1− F (θ))FN−1(θ)dθ
= θˆ(1− F |C|(θˆ))FN−|C|(θˆ) +
∫ θ¯
θˆ
(1− F |C|(θ))FN−|C|(θ)dθ
+
∫ θ¯
θˆ
θ(1− F |C|(θ))dFN−|C|(θ)−
∫ θ¯
θˆ
|C|(1− F (θ))FN−1(θ)dθ,
where the second equality follows from integration by parts. Subtracting this expression from
(27) yields
E
[∑
i∈C
(
Ki(φi(θN\C))− Ji(θi)
)
q∗i (θ)
]
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= E
[(
K(θ
(1)
N\C)− J(θ(1)C )
)
1{θ(1)C >θ
(1)
N\C}
]
= (K(θˆ)− θˆ)(1− F |C|(θˆ))FN−|C|(θˆ)
+
∫ θ¯
θˆ
[
(N − |C| − 1)(1− F |C|(θ))FN−|C|(θ) + |C|(1− F (θ))FN−1(θ)] dθ > 0,
satisfying Condition (SB).
In case C = N , (3) is just a restatement of Condition (SB) with θ
(1)
N\C = θˆ.
Proof of Theorem 2. Since Mˆ implements V ∗, it suffices to prove that Mˆ is WCP. To this
end, consider any C ∈ C with |C| ≥ 2. Suppose all bidders outside C report truthfully, but
cartel C contemplates a manipulation of Mˆ , M˜ = (q˜, t˜), that satisfies (IC∗C) and (IR
Mˆ
C ).
Then, there exists a function µC : ΘC 7→ ∆ΘC such that (RMˆC ), (RMˆN\C), (BBMˆC ) and (BBMˆN\C)
hold. Since the same sale price is charged against a cartel no matter how many of its members
participate, it cannot gain from non-participation of its members. Hence, without loss, we
assume that µC places no weight on Θ\Θ.
We first prove that q˜(θ) = q∗(θ) for almost every θ ∈ Θ. To this end, suppose this is not
the case. Then,
αC(
∑
i∈C
U M˜i (θ¯)) + (1− αC)(
∑
i∈C
U M˜i (θ))
= E
[∑
i∈C
HC(θi)q˜i(θ)−
∑
i∈C
t˜i(θ)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
HC(θi)q˜i(θ)−
∑
i∈C
EµC(θC)[tˆi(θ˜C , θN\C)]
]
≤ E
[∑
i∈C
HC(θi)q˜i(θ)− EµC(θC)[δC(θ˜C , θN\C)
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
HC(θi)q˜i(θ)−HC(θ(1)N\C)EµC(θC)[
∑
i∈C
q∗i (θ˜C , θN\C)]
]
= E
[∑
i∈C
[HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C)]q˜i(θ)
]
< E
[∑
i∈C
[HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C)]q∗i (θ)
]
(28)
= αC(
∑
i∈C
U Mˆi (θ¯)) + (1− αC)(
∑
i∈C
U Mˆi (θ)).
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The first equality follows from Lemma 0, the second from equation (BBMˆC ), the third from
the definition of δC(·), the fourth from (RMˆC ), and the last equality from the above string of
equalities repeated in the reverse order. The weak inequality follows from the construction
of tˆi(·) for i ∈ C as in (5) and (6). Lastly, the strict inequality follows from the definition of
αC and the strict monotonicity of HC(·). To see this, we compare the LHS and RHS of the
inequality (28) at the ex-post level: (i) if θk > max{maxi∈N\{k} θi, θˆ} for some k ∈ C, then
q∗k(θ) = 1 6= q˜k(θ) implies that
LHS =
∑
i∈C
(HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C))q˜i(θi) < HC(θk)−HC(θ(1)N\C) = RHS,
(ii) if θk > max{maxi∈N\{k} θi, θˆ} for some k ∈ N\C, then any manipulated allocation different
from q∗(·) implies q˜k(θ) < 1 and q˜k′(θ) > 0 for some k′ ∈ C,18 and thus
LHS =
∑
i∈C
(HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C))q˜i(θi) =
∑
i∈C
(HC(θi)−HC(θk))q˜i(θi) < 0 = RHS,
(iii) if maxi∈N θi < θˆ, then q˜(θ) 6= q∗(θ) = 0 implies that the LHS is negative while the RHS is
zero. In sum, the LHS of (28) is always less than the RHS, which means that M˜ worsens the
(interim) payoff of either the highest type or the lowest type of at least one collusive bidder.
This contradicts that M˜ satisfies (IRMˆC ). We have thus proven that q˜(θ) = q
∗(θ) for almost
every θ.
It follows from this result that the gross surplus realized within C from M˜ is the same as
from Mˆ , and, combined with (4), that the cartel pays the same expected payments with M˜ as
with Mˆ . Hence, the net total expected payoff accruing to C from M˜ is the same as from Mˆ .
Together with (IRMˆC ), this implies that no bidder of C is strictly better off from manipulation
M˜ . Since this is true for all feasible manipulation of Mˆ , we conclude that Mˆ is WCP.
For the remainder of proofs, we will often use the following transfer rule: Given an alloca-
tion rule qi(·) and a sale price r, if all bidders participate, then for each i ∈ N
ti(θ) :=
1
n
r
∑
j∈N
qj(θ) +
(
Ti(θi)− 1
n
rEθ˜−i
[∑
j∈N
qj(θi, θ˜−i)
])
− 1
n− 1
∑
k∈N\{i}
(
Tk(θk)− 1
n
rEθ˜−k
[∑
j∈N
qj(θk, θ˜−k)
])
+ ρi, (29)
18This follows from the fact that noncollusive bidders always report truthfully so collusive bidders can change
the allocation only by announcing that one of them has at least θk > θˆ, and getting themselves allocated the
object.
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where
Ti(θi) := θiEθ˜−i
[
qi(θi, θ˜−i)
]
−
∫ θi
θi
Eθ˜−i
[
qi(a, θ˜−i)
]
da
and ρi ∈ R with
∑
i∈N ρi = 0. If some bidder does not participate, then the payment of r is
equally shared among those who participate while others make no payments. Note from this
and (29) that
∑
i∈N ti(θ) = r
∑
i∈N qi(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ, implying that bidders pay a sale price r as
long as at least one bidder participates. Note also that if all bidders participate, then
Eθ˜−i
[
ti(θi, θ˜−i)
]
= Ti(θi) + ci,∀i,∀θi,
for some constant ci, implying that the incentive compatibility is satisfied as long as the
interim allocation probability is nondecreasing. The (IR) constraint will be checked later
wherever required.
Proof of Theorem 3. Construct a transfer rule tˆ(·) by substituting q∗(·) and r∗ into (29). It
is straightforward that one can choose ρi’s to let tˆ(·) satisfy (IR) condition. Thus, Mˆ = (q∗, tˆ)
satisfies (IC∗) and implements the second-best outcome without collusion.
To prove that Mˆ is WCP consists of several steps.
Step 1. Suppose that a feasible manipulation, M = (q, t), of Mˆ (by N) satisfies UMi (θi) >
U Mˆi (θi) for some i ∈ N . Then, there exists another feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) that
satisfies
U M˜i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈ N, and E
[∑
i∈N
U M˜i (θi)
]
> E
[∑
i∈N
U Mˆi (θi)
]
. (30)
Proof. Available in the Supplementary Material.
Step 2. For any feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) of Mˆ that satisfies U M˜i (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈
N , we have ∫ J−1i (r∗)
θi
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi ≤ 0,∀i ∈ N. (31)
The inequality holds strictly unless Q˜i(θi) = Q
∗
i (θi),∀θi ≤ J−1i (r∗).
Proof. It follows from the assumption on M˜ that for all i ∈ N and all θi ∈ Θi,
Xi(θi) :=
∫ θi
θi
[Q˜i(a)−Q∗i (a)]da = U M˜i (θi)− U M˜i (θi)− [U Mˆi (θi)− U Mˆi (θi)]
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= U M˜i (θi)− U Mˆi (θi) ≥ 0.
Then, the integration by parts yields∫ J−1i (r∗)
θi
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi
= (Ji(θi)− r∗)fi(θi)Xi(θi)
∣∣∣J−1i (r∗)
θi
−
∫ J−1i (r∗)
θi
Xi(θi)d [(Ji(θi)− r∗)fi(θi)]
= −
∫ J−1i (r∗)
θi
Xi(θi)d [(Ji(θi)− r∗)fi(θi)] ≤ 0,
since (Ji(·)−r∗)fi(·) is increasing. The inequality is strict unlessXi(θi) = 0 for all θi ≤ J−1i (r∗),
that is Q˜i(θi) = Q
∗
i (θi) for all θi ≤ J−1i (r∗).
To state the next step, we define Θ∗ := {θ ∈ Θ|maxi∈N Ji(θi) ≥ r∗}.
Step 3. For any feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) of Mˆ by N that satisfies U M˜i (θi) =
U Mˆi (θi),∀i ∈ N , we have Q˜i(θi) = Qˆ∗i (θi), ∀i ∈ N , ∀θi ∈ Θi.
Proof. Consider another allocation rule, q¯(·), with q¯i(θ) = q˜i(θ) if θi ≥ J−1i (r∗) and q¯i(θ) =
q∗i (θ) otherwise, and let Q¯i(θi) := Eθ−i [q¯(θi, θ−i)], for each i ∈ N . (Whether Q¯i(·) is monotonic
or whether q¯i(·) is implementable is irrelevant for the subsequent argument.) Then, it holds
that ∑
i∈N
∫ θi
J−1i (r∗)
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi
=
∑
i∈N
∫ θi
θi
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q¯i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi
= E
[∑
i∈N
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(q¯i(θ)− q∗i (θ))
]
= Eθ∈Θ∗
[∑
i∈N
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(q¯i(θ)− q∗i (θ))
]
= Eθ∈Θ∗
[∑
i∈N
(Ji(θi)− r∗)q¯i(θ)
]
− Eθ∈Θ∗
[
max
i∈N
Ji(θi)− r∗
]
≤ 0, (32)
where the inequality follows from the definition of q∗(·) and becomes strict unless q˜(θ) = q∗(θ)
for almost all θ ∈ Θ∗. Thus, we have
0 ≤
∑
i∈N
[U˜i(θi)− Uˆi(θi)]−
∑
i∈N
∫ θi
J−1i (r∗)
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi
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=
∑
i∈N
∫ J−1i (r∗)
θi
(Ji(θi)− r∗)(Q˜i(θi)−Q∗i (θi))fi(θi)dθi.
In order not to contradict Step 2, this inequality and the inequality (31) both must hold as
equality, which in turn implies that the inequality (32) also must hold as equality. Then, (31)
and (32) can hold as equality only if Q˜i(θi) = Q
∗
i (θi),∀θi ≤ J−1i (r∗), and q˜(θ) = q∗(θ), for
almost all θ ∈ Θ∗, which yields the desired result.
Step 4. Mˆ is WCP.
Proof. Consider any feasible manipulation M = (q, t). We claim that UMi (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈
N . Suppose not. By Step 1, we can find another feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) satisfying
(30). Then, by Step 3,
U M˜i (θi) = U
M˜
i (θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Q˜i(a)da = U
Mˆ
i (θi) +
∫ θi
θi
Q∗i (a)da = U
Mˆ
i (θi),
which contradicts the inequality in (30). Thus, it must be that UMi (θi) = U
Mˆ
i (θi),∀i ∈ N .
Applying Step 3 again, we have Q˜i(·) = Q∗i (·) for all i ∈ N , implying that M yields the same
interim payoffs as Mˆ to the bidders, which means that Mˆ is WCP.
Proof of Theorem 5. Suppose that a pair, r0 and qˆ(·), solves [C]. Construct the transfer
rule tˆ(·) by substituting r0 and qˆ(·) into (29). We show that an auction rule Mˆ = (qˆ, tˆ)
implements the solution outcome of [C] and is WCP. To ensure that Mˆ implements the
solution of [C] absent collusion, we only need to check (IR) constraint. For this, note that
due to the fact
∑
i∈N tˆi(θ) = r0
∑
i∈N qˆi(θ) and (IC
∗
1), we have
∑
i∈N
U Mˆi (θi) = E
[∑
i∈N
Ji(θi)qˆi(θ)− r0
∑
i∈N
qˆi(θ)
]
≥ 0.
Thus, one can choose ρi’s so that each bidder’s (IR) constraint is satisfied.
We next prove that Mˆ is WCP. Consider any feasible manipulation M˜ = (q˜, t˜) of Mˆ .
Then, we have
∑
i∈N
U M˜i (θ¯) = E
[∑
i∈N
K(θi)q˜i(θ)−
∑
i∈N
t˜i(θ)
]
= E
[∑
i∈N
(K(θi)− r0)q˜i(θ)]
]
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≤ E
[∑
i∈N
(K(θi)− r0)qˆi(θ)
]
=
∑
i∈N
U Mˆi (θ¯),
where the inequality follows from the definition of qˆ(·) and becomes strict unless q˜(·) = qˆ(·).
Thus, (IRMˆN ) requires q˜(·) = qˆ(·), so
E
[∑
i∈N
t˜i(θ)
]
= E
[
r0
∑
i∈N
q˜i(θ)
]
= E
[
r0
∑
i∈N
qˆi(θ)
]
= E
[∑
i∈N
tˆi(θ)
]
,
which, along with (IRMˆN ), implies that U
M˜
i (·) = U Mˆi (·), ∀i. We thus conclude that Mˆ is WCP.
We now show that the solution of [C] is characterized by (9), (10), and (11), assuming
that Condition (SB) does not hold. We first show that the solution involves the allocation
rule of the form described in (11), whatever the value of r0 is. Let λR and λK denote the
Lagrangian (nonnegative) multipliers for the constraints (IC∗1) and (K), respectively. Then,
the Lagrangian for the problem [C] is written as
E
[∑
i∈N
(
r + λR(J(θi)− r) + λK min{K(θi)− r, 0}
)
qi(θ)
]
.
Since the maximand is symmetric across bidders and linearly increasing with each qi, the
optimal allocation should follow the efficient cutoff rule: Namely, there exists a threshold
value θ¯ such that the rule allocates the object to a bidder whose type is highest and above
θ¯. Next observe the constraint (K) must be binding at the solution; or else, the solution
corresponds to the second-best outcome. This yields a contradiction, since the solution is
WCP implementable and the second-best outcome cannot be WCP implementable without
Condition (SB). Therefore, (K) is binding, from which it follows that θ¯ = K−1(r0).
The optimal sale price r0 depends on whether (IC
∗
1) is binding or not. If (IC
∗
1) is not
binding, then given the efficient cutoff rule as in (11), r0 must satisfy (9). Meanwhile, (IC
∗
1)
is slack only if
E[J(θ(1)N )|θ(1)N > K−1(r0)] > r0.
If this inequality does not hold at the level solving (9), then (IC∗1) must be binding, so r0
must satisfy (10).
Proof of Theorem 6. Recall first that the original auction M∗ is the second-price auction.
Since the auction A has the same allocation/payment rule as M∗ for bidders outside C,
it is weakly dominant for them to participate in A and report their true types. Fix any
Bayesian Nash equilibrium in EA. Letting M˜ = (q˜, t˜) denote the mechanism resulting from
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the equilibrium play of bidders, we show that M˜ must yield V ∗ to the seller. First of all, M˜
must satisfy (IC∗) since in the equilibrium, each bidder is forming a correct belief about what
types propose or accept/reject a collusive side contract, and thereafter playing sequentially
rational strategy.19 We now establish that both Mˆ and M˜ must yield the same interim payoffs
for all collusive bidders. Let us first consider case (a). Then, since (12) holds strictly for all
θ′,
T ∗i (θ¯) > E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
]
. (33)
Define
Θ˘C := {θC ∈ ΘC | ∃i ∈ C with type θi that announces rz}.20
Then, for all θC ∈ ΘC ,
E
[∑
i∈C
t˜i(θ)
]
= E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
(∑
i∈C
q˜i(θ)
)
1{θC /∈Θ˘C} + T
∗
i (θ¯)1{θC∈Θ˘C}
]
≥ E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
(∑
i∈C
q˜i(θ)
)
1{θC /∈Θ˘C} +HC(θ
(1)
N\C)1{θC∈Θ˘C}
]
≥ E
[
HC(θ
(1)
N\C)
∑
i∈C
q˜i(θ)
]
, (34)
where the first inequality follows from (33). Thus,
αC(
∑
i∈C
U M˜i (θ¯)) + (1− αC)(
∑
i∈C
U M˜i (θ)) = E
[∑
i∈C
HC(θi)q˜i(θ)−
∑
i∈C
t˜i(θ)
]
≤ E
[∑
i∈C
[HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C)]q˜i(θ)
]
≤ E
[∑
i∈C
[HC(θi)−HC(θ(1)N\C)]q∗i (θ)
]
= αC(
∑
i∈C
U Mˆi (θ¯)) + (1− αC)(
∑
i∈C
U Mˆi (θ)),
where the first and last equalities follow from Lemma 0, the first inequality follows from (34),
and the second follows from the definition of q∗(·). Indeed, both inequalities must hold as
19Since θ∅ ∈ Bi for each i ∈ C, every type of bidder i can secure at least zero (or individual rational) payoff
whenever participating in A so that M˜ must satisfy (IR) condition.
20A mixed strategy which randomizes between rz and some other messages can be accommodated without
changing the subsequent result.
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equality since (i) U M˜i (θ) ≥ 0 = U Mˆi (θ) and (ii) U M˜i (θ¯) ≥ U Mˆi (θ¯) for all i ∈ C. First, (i) is
immediate from the fact that M˜ satisfies (IC∗). To show (ii), suppose to the contrary that
U M˜i (θ¯) < U
Mˆ
i (θ¯) for some i ∈ C. Then, bidder i has a profitable deviation to announce
rz with a sufficiently high z, since it will yield him an (interim) payoff arbitrarily close to
θ¯ − T ∗i (θ¯) = U Mˆi (θ¯), a contradiction. Now, both inequalities hold with equalities only if Θ˘C
is a measure zero set and q˜i(·) = q∗i (·), which implies that the interim payoffs in Mˆ and M˜
can only differ by constants. That (i) and (ii) hold with equalities in turn implies that those
constants have to be zero. Consequently, Mˆ and M˜ must yield the same interim payoffs for
all parties, which implies that M˜ must yields the seller her second-best payoff V ∗.
The proof is similar for the case (b), upon two observations. First, adding the message rz
does not give the cartel any new opportunity to manipulate Mˆ since announcing rz results
in the same outcome as each collusive bidder announcing θr. Second, since (13) holds, the
highest type of any bidder i ∈ C can announce rz (with sufficiently large z) to obtain at least
its noncollusive payoff U Mˆi (θ¯).
Last, we prove for the case (a) that EA is non-empty. (A similar proof follows for the
case (b).) To this end, we show that there exists a weak perfect Bayesian, and thus Bayesian
Nash, equilibrium in which each cartel member proposes no side contract. If no one proposes
a side contract, then each collusive bidder i with type θi plays Mˆ and obtains his equilibrium
payoff U Mˆi (θi). If a side contract is proposed, then each collusive bidder i responds as follows:
“Report θ∅ if θi < T ∗i (θ) or else report rzi for some integer zi > 1.” This response is supported
by the out-of-equilibrium belief of bidder i that each bidder j 6= i in C reports rz′ for some
z′ < zi if θj > T ∗j (θ), and θ∅ otherwise.
We now show that this strategy profile constitutes a weak perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
First of all, a deviation by some collusive bidder or third party to a side contract will trigger
the response as above and yield each collusive bidder i with θi at most max{θi − T ∗i (θ), 0},
which is no greater than U Mˆi (θi), his equilibrium payoff. Second, once a side contract has
been proposed (out of equilibrium), it is optimal for a collusive bidder i with type θi > T
∗
i (θ)
to report rzi and obtain θi − T ∗i (θ) > 0, given his belief that every other collusive bidder will
report either rz′ or θ∅. Also, bidder i with θi < T ∗i (θ) optimally reports θ∅ to obtain zero
payoff since (i) reporting some rz instead is clearly suboptimal and (ii) reporting some type
from Θi yields either zero payoff (in case some other collusive bidder reports rz) or at most
θi − δC(θ) < 0 (in case every other collusive bidder reports θ∅), and thus is suboptimal too.
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